Over the past couple of decades, there have been great developments in the fields of psychology and cognitive neuroscience that have allowed the advancement of our understanding of how people make judgements about causality in several domains. We provide a review of some of the contemporary psychological models of causal thinking that are directly relevant to legal reasoning. In addition, we cover some exciting new research using advanced neuroimaging techniques that have helped to uncover the underlying neural signatures of complex causal reasoning. Through the use of functional imaging, we provide a first-hand look at how the brain responds to evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with one's beliefs and expectations. Based on the data covered in this review, we propose some ideas for how the effectiveness of causal reasoning, especially as it pertains to legal decision-making, may be facilitated.
INTRODUCTION
The human mind has evolved many cognitive tools including abstraction, counterfactual thought, deduction and induction, for a vast variety of circumstances that are applied differently depending on the task at hand. Central to these domain general processes is causal thinking. An individual's ability to determine if a precipitating event was the cause of an outcome is essential for making sense of the complex world in which we live. Indeed, many of the learning and evaluative processes in which individuals engage pertain to the development and testing of causal models portraying the relationship between variables of interest (Dunbar 1995; . Such causal reasoning processes are evident in tasks ranging from simple everyday reasoning, such as why one's computer crashes, to complex scientific discovery, such as the formulation of the 'Universal Law of Gravitation' in the Principia by The Royal Society's former president Isaac Newton (Newton 1999) .
This ability to infer causality is not only crucial for human reasoning in general, but also more specifically to the application of law. The legal system often asks lawyers, jurors and judges to determine if an individual's actions were responsible for a specific outcome. In so doing, the legal system requires that individuals reason about the evidence presented to them in an unbiased manner, formulating a judgement of causality if and only if the evidence presented to them overwhelmingly depict the acts of the defendant as causally responsible for the outcome under question.
In the present essay, we address two main questions that are directly relevant to such legal reasoning: (i) what sources of information do people use to evaluate causality, and (ii) to what degree do people evaluate evidence about causality in an unbiased manner? To answer these questions we will discuss both behavioural and fMRI experiments conducted in our laboratory and others.
LEGAL DECISION-MAKING AND CAUSAL
REASONING Whereas much decision-making research in the legal domain has focused on the content-oriented (i.e. substance of the trial itself ) aspects of legal decision-making (e.g. Matlon 1986 ), research on the extra-legal aspects of legal decision-making (i.e. decision-making strategies of individuals) has primarily been conducted by cognitive and social psychologists (see Pennington & Hastie (1990) for a comprehensive review). Perhaps not surprisingly, much of this work has focused on criminal jury decision-making processes, especially as they pertain to judgements involving more serious crimes often involving capital punishment (e.g. Constanzo & Constanzo 1994; Wiener et al. 1995) . The ability of jurors to make decisions in a non-arbitrary and unbiased manner in these situations is of obvious importance. Courts ask jurors to set aside personal beliefs and biases to make judgements in favour of, or against, a defendant based solely on the facts of the case presented to them. This unbiased application of the law is crucial, not only for obvious judicial reasons, but also to maintain consistency among rulings within and across jurisdictions. As alluded to in x 1, one's ability to make such judgements is directly related to one's ability to effectively attribute causality when presented with evidence. This evidence can come from a variety of sources and often involves the construction of causal chains of events, whereby the link between the actions of the defendant and the outcome under question may be separated by several intermediate variables, each with a specific probability of occurring (Einhorn & Hogarth 1986) . Indeed, this is not an easy task.
Researchers in both cognitive and social psychology have developed several models that capture different aspects of this causal reasoning process. The predominant view of causality in the psychological literature over the past two decades has dealt with the extent to which people induce causality based on observed statistical covariation-based evidence (e.g. Jenkins & Ward 1965; Rescorla 1968; Kelley 1973; Allan & Jenkins 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth 1986; Cheng & Novick 1990 , 1992 Cheng 1997; White 2002 ). These models of causality stem from the Humean philosophy of radical empiricism (Hume 1978) , which is based on the assumption that events that covary are more likely to be judged as causally related than events that do not covary. Such models typically propose computational algorithms by which reasoners are thought to derive an estimate of causality from such observable correlated events, and delineate conditions under which the covariation between variables of interest can be used to infer causality.
There are several different models of causal reasoning, each proposing different accounts of how people induce causality based on observed statistical covariation. Most derive estimates of the degree of covariation based on computing statistical contrasts between the presence and absence of events and outcomes. Perhaps the most popular contemporary model of causality that is based on this covariation principle in the recent psychological literature is the Power PC theory (Cheng 1997; Novick & Cheng 2004) . According to this model, an individual considers both the probability of the effect occurring in the presence of the cause [P(e/c)] and the probability of the effect occurring in the absence of the cause ½P(e= $ c). Specifically, Cheng and her colleagues propose that the perceived causal relationship between variables of interest is a function of both the cause's covariation with the given effect [quantified as P(e=c)ÀP(e= $ c) and the inverse of the base rate ½1ÀP(e=Àc) of that effect. That is, reasoners are suggested to view an individual or an event as a cause of a specific outcome to the extent that the individual or event raises the likelihood of the outcome above some baseline of the outcome occurring when the individual or event is absent. Specifically, the extent to which smoking may be judged as causally responsible for the incidence of lung cancer in a group of patients would depend, not only on the degree to which smoking and lung cancer co-occur together, but also the degree to which lung cancer occurs in the absence of smoking. Proponents of this and other similar covariationbased models (e.g. Cheng & Novick 1990 , 1992 White 2002) claim that people are sensitive to the covariation between the cause and effect, and then use this information to derive a measure of the causal link or liability of the causal candidates in question.
An alternative account for how people may judge an individual or an event as liable for an outcome concerns the extent to which that individual or outcome is judged to be a rare or an abnormal event in the given situation. Hilton & Slugoski (1986) have proposed such a model, the Abnormal Conditions Focus model. They propose the causal inference progresses in two stages. The first stage is proposed to involve a judgement about the degree to which a candidate is perceived to be necessary for the occurrence of the effect. For example, both oxygen and flame are necessary, but not sufficient variables required for paper to burn; in the absence of either event, paper would not burn. Consequently, both causes would be selected during the first stage of reasoning. The second stage of reasoning involves selecting the abnormal variable from the set of necessary causes identified by the first stage of reasoning. That is, a cause is selected that departs from that which is normal for the given circumstances. Hilton and Slugoski provide a helpful example that clarifies these two components. They note that the speed of a train, the weight of the railway cars, and a faulty rail are all necessary components for a train to derail. However, the faulty rail is the one component that is likely to be selected as causally relevant, because it is the single feature from the set that is abnormal for the everyday operation of trains.
Whereas the former models stress the role of observed covariation-based evidence, other cognitive models have examined the degree to which people judge causality based on their beliefs and expectations about what events have the capacity or power to produce specific outcomes. These models stem from the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant (1965) who proposed that causality is an inherent law of nature, not merely an emergent property of statistical regularity. Harre & Madden (1975; see also Hart & Honore 1959; White 1989 White , 1995 Ahn et al. 1995) have elaborated on this philosophical tradition by positing that certain objects are perceived to possess stable properties whose power to produce a specific outcome is based on the 'chemical, physical, or genetic natures of the entities involved' (p. 5). For example, individuals may judge smoking to be causally related to the development of lung cancer owing to their beliefs about the carcinogenic properties of inhaling tobacco, independently of the degree to which they may be thought to correlate in the actual environment.
Harre and Madden further elucidate the relationship between causal agents and enabling conditions. That is, a specific causal outcome is thought to occur only under the appropriate enabling conditions. For example, an individual may possess the disposition to commit a violent crime; however, this disposition may only result in a violent act if the individual is intoxicated. In this example, intoxication would act as the enabling or releasing condition that allows the disposition of the individual (that is, to be aggressive) to be released. Based on these defining features of causality, causal roles are defined conceptually, rather than based solely on observing correlations between variables in the environment. The assessment of causal hypotheses, therefore, is thought to be mainly a matter of seeking some object believed to possess the power to produce the effect in question and then determining if the appropriate releasing conditions are present to enable the power of the object to exert the effect (see Dunbar (2002) for an example of this phenomenon in scientists reasoning 'live' in their laboratories). In many cases, this search for an object that possesses the power to produce a specific outcome may supersede the search for evidence about the covariation between variables of interest (e.g. White 1989; Ahn et al. 1995) .
INTEGRATING EVIDENCE WITH ONE'S BELIEFS
AND EXPECTATIONS Recently, our laboratory and others have been conducting several behavioural experiments examining the degree to which an individual's beliefs and expectations (derived from information about the inherent properties of objects) influence how they make causal decisions about covariation-based evidence. Several studies have found that individuals appear to have great difficulty evaluating evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs. For example, research in a variety of disciplines including cognitive psychology (e.g. Bruner et al. 1956; Wason 1968; Mynatt et al. 1977; Koriat et al. 1980; Klayman & Ha 1987; Evans 1989) , judicial reasoning (e.g. Hendry & Shaffer 1989; Pennington & Hastie 1993; Simon 2004; Simon et al. 2004 ) and medical reasoning (e.g. Elstein & Bordage 1979) have all demonstrated examples of biases in evidence-based decision-making. The typical finding is that people are more likely to attend to, seek out and evaluate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs, and ignore or downplay evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs. In a series of experiments conducted in our laboratory, we have examined how reasoners appear to use their prior knowledge and expectations to constrain how they evaluate covariationbased evidence.
In one series of studies we ) created a causal thinking situation where participants were asked to test the effectiveness of novel drugs designed to produce a particular outcome. The plausibility of the causal theories was manipulated by presenting participants with a brief introductory statement, which depicted a causal theory that contained either a plausible mechanism of action or an implausible mechanism of action. This manipulation was intended to induce a specific belief about how the potential cause may produce an expected outcome. Evidence was then provided to participants in a trial-by-trial format where they viewed multiple trials of evidence for each type of drug. Under some conditions the candidate cause covaried strongly with an expected outcome; under other conditions the candidate cause covaried weakly with an expected outcome. Here, for example, evidence of a strong covariation would be consistent with their beliefs and expectations based on a plausible theory and inconsistent with their beliefs and expectations based on an implausible theory.
The basic finding is that people weight the covariationbased evidence stronger when it follows from a theory that contains a plausible mechanism of action than when the evidence follows from a theory that contains an implausible mechanism of action (see Fugelsang & Thompson 2000 . We have argued that this could be seen as a useful heuristic given the potentially infinite number of covarying causes for every given effect occurring in the natural environment. Using one's beliefs and expectations to filter out evidence for implausible theories serves to make the task of building causal theories from evidence achievable. Of course, this heuristic does have a drawback in that potentially valid evidence may be discounted if it is inconsistent with a theory that an individual has strong beliefs in.
BRAIN-BASED CORRELATES OF COMPLEX
CAUSAL REASONING An exciting recent approach to the study of human reasoning and decision-making has accompanied the advent of advanced functional brain imaging techniques such as positron emission topography, event-related potentials and fMRI. Using these new techniques, we are able to get a first-hand look at how the brain responds during complex reasoning. Recent work by several cognitive neuroscientists has examined the neurological underpinnings of a variety of complex reasoning and decision-making processes including problem solving (Goel & Grafman 1995; Colvin et al. 2001; Fincham et al. 2002) , analogical reasoning (Wharton et al. 2000; Kroger et al. 2002; A. Green, J. Fugelsang, N. Shamosh and K. Dunbar, unpublished data) , inductive reasoning (Goel & Dolan 2000; Seger et al. 2000) and deductive reasoning (Osherson et al. 1998; Parsons & Osherson 2001; Goel & Dolan 2003) . The major research approach has been to have participants take part in a task that taps a specific reasoning process of interest (e.g. deductive reasoning) and contrast that with a control task that contains much of the same visual and cognitive stimulation but devoid of the specific reasoning process of interest. By contrasting the task-related brain activations of the specific reasoning task with the control task, researchers are able to measure the unique brain activity associated with the specific reasoning process of interest.
We have taken a slightly different approach in our research programme on the neural underpinning of complex causal reasoning. Rather than using fMRI to uncover specialized neural circuitry for causal thinking, we have been examining how reasoning with statistical covariation-based evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with participants' beliefs recruits brain networks that have been implicated in several more domain general cognitive processes. Specifically, we have been using fMRI to uncover the mechanisms by which statistical evidence is integrated with one's beliefs and expectations about that evidence in the brain.
The main question that motivated this research programme was the extent to which people might be more inclined to attend to and assimilate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs, while treating evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs as error. If that was the case, there are several key brain networks that might be the neural signature of these processes. For example, research in behavioural and cognitive neuroscience has indicated that there are several different brain networks that are invoked during learning (e.g. McDermott et al. 1999; Poldrack et al. 2002) and in error detection and conflict monitoring (e.g. Botvinick et al. 2001; Holroyd & Cole 2002; Kerns et al. 2004; Yeung et al. 2004 ) that may be invoked for these different conditions. Based on our prior behavioural research, we predicted that different networks related to learning and conflict monitoring may show increased activity when participants are receiving evidence that is consistent, or inconsistent, respectively, with their beliefs and expectations.
Using a similar paradigm to that of our behavioural experiments, we measured the task-related blood oxygenlevel-dependent response as participants observed evidence on the effectiveness of drugs designed to relieve depressive symptoms. The plausibility of the theory of action of the drug and whether the data were consistent or inconsistent with the theory were varied. We found that when people were reasoning with evidence that was consistent with their beliefs, a distinct network of brain regions widely associated with learning and memory were significantly activated, including the caudate and the parahippocampal gyrus. By contrast, when the evidence was inconsistent with people's beliefs, a different pattern of activation occurred that is widely associated with error detection and conflict resolution, including the anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate and the precuneus. A graphical depiction of this brain-based model of these findings is depicted in figure 1 where symbols in green depict the observed brain network activated when beliefs and evidence are consistent, and symbols in red depict the observed brain network activated when beliefs and evidence are inconsistent. These findings provide a neural instantiation for the behavioural interactions between beliefs and evidence that we covered in x 3. Specifically, people's beliefs and expectations may act as a biological filter during evidence evaluation by selectively recruiting learning mechanisms for evidence that is consistent with their beliefs and error detection mechanisms for evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL
DECISION-MAKING In this essay, we have covered a variety of experimental studies that demonstrate how people's evaluation of evidence is highly influenced by their beliefs about the objects and events under consideration. That is, people typically do not evaluate evidence in an atheoretical manner; rather they use their beliefs and expectations to guide their assessment of the evidence given to them (e.g. Evans et al. 1983; ). This interplay between one's beliefs and evidence has a distinct neural signature, in that evidence that is consistent with one's beliefs is more likely to recruit neural tissue involved in learning and memory, whereas evidence that is inconsistent with one's beliefs is more likely to invoke neural tissue associated with error detection and conflict monitoring.
These findings have important implications for legal reasoning. Specifically, the human brain appears to be specifically sensitive to the degree to which evidence, in the form of statistical information, is consistent with the expectations of the individual. Is this something that the brain does automatically, or do people have conscious cognitive control over this process? Indeed, the answer to this question may have large implications for how one can hope to minimize the influence of such biases when they hinder legal decision-making. The finding that these brain-based dissociations occur when evidence is first being evaluated suggests that people may be unable to set aside their beliefs and expectation when making judgements about causality. These data are corroborated by some recent findings by Fugelsang & Thompson (2003) . They provided data that showed that individuals were unable to gauge the degree to which their beliefs and expectations influenced their evaluation of statistical evidence. Taken together, these findings suggest that individuals may not be entirely aware of the extent to which their expectations influence their decisions when judging evidence.
Judges and lawyers are very aware that people can be biased in their reasoning. Our results indicate that there may be brain-based underpinnings for these biases. Knowing that one's beliefs can hinder reasoning, and that this may occur at an automatic or unconscious level, what additional strides can be taken to minimize the influence of one's beliefs when they may hinder legal reasoning? Several researchers have found that instructions developed to augment the relevance of normative information can reduce the impact that one's beliefs have on their reasoning (Evans 2002; Evans et al. 1994) . Specifically, Evans and colleagues have found that instructions that emphasize the role of logical form of a problem can result in a decrease in the influence of the content of the scenarios. In addition, Dunbar (1993) found that altering the goal of a reasoner could be very effective in switching a reasoner's strategy from one of confirmation seeking to disconfirmation seeking.
An important avenue for future research would be to examine the role of making individuals cognizant of the potential biasing effects of their beliefs before they engage in legal reasoning. Laying out potential alternative hypotheses before the presentation of evidence may minimize the influence of specific beliefs on the part of the individual asked to weigh the evidence. In addition, the biasing effects of beliefs on evidential evaluation and subsequent judgements are surely influenced by several factors related to the acquisition and maintenance of those beliefs. For example, beliefs may vary in terms of several variables, such as personal relevance, age of initial acquisition and original source of acquisition, that may be orthogonal to the strength of those beliefs. In addition, the extent to which such extra-legal factors (e.g. belief biases in decision-making) influence different content-oriented factors of the judicial process (e.g. judges' instructions, examination of witnesses and the use of exhibits) is still relatively unknown. Further cross-talk between cognitive neuroscientists and legal academics and professionals will do much to inform these future research endeavours.
